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Governance Structures in Russian manufacturing: 
assessment using sample survey data  
 
by Svetlana Avdasheva and Nadezhda Goreyko1 
 
 
Abstract 
The analysis of governance structures in Russian manufacturing does not only 
enable exploring the industrial organization and upgrading of companies, but also 
brings forefront the transaction costs faced by market participants. From this 
perspective, it is important to examine Russian industries, since models of 
organizational structure have been developing in Russia only within the last 20 
years, under the influence of transaction costs associated with the transition 
economy.  
Despite the importance of governance structures within the framework of 
analysis of markets, competition, and inter-firm cooperation in transition economy, 
the model of Russian organizational structure has been studied insufficiently. The 
main objective of this work is to fill the gaps in studies of alternative governance 
mechanisms in Russian industries, and to review organization and behavior of 
enterprises as a part of hierarchical, market, and hybrid models. The empirical 
analysis is based on the data obtained from interviews of Russia’s mid-sized 
manufacturing enterprises. 
Preliminary results show that, first, in contrary to expectation, hierarchical 
governance does not prevail in the manufacturing industries, and second, 
governance structures affect organization of corporate control, willingness to price- 
and non-price competition, investment decisions, incentives and possibilities to 
upgrade and also the assessment of contract risk and contract protection in directions 
predicted by institutional theory and theory of value chain. 
 
JEL classification numbers: L14, L23, P23 
Key words: governance structure, manufacturing, transition, upgrading, Russia.  
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Introduction 
Governance in Russian industries was developed under the influence of 
organizational shock on transition. In the early 1990s the socialist system of 
decision-making was completely broken and replaced by decentralized system of 
coordination. Contractual relations among market participants, in spite of the fact 
that they are affected by previous experience (path-dependence), were built on new 
grounds using new enforcement tools. The consequences of break of the stable 
economic ties between enterprises were so severe that they deserve a name of 
‘disorganization’ (Blanchard, Kremer, 1997). Till now disorganization is considered 
as one of the important causes of transformational decline of the industrial output in 
1990s. Therefore, restructuring of contractual arrangements of Russian enterprises is 
one of the most important parts of transition processes in Russian economy. 
In this regard there is an interesting question about the comparative advantages 
of governance mechanisms, which arose on the ruins of disorganization. However 
this issue attracted surprisingly little attention in the recent studies of transition 
markets. Despite the understanding of important role of institutional change under 
transition (Pejovic, 2003) the specific features of new contractual arrangements in 
Russia, as many others transition economies are studies insufficiently.  
Mismatch between the importance of the development of governance structures 
as a key feature of industrial organization and the number of empirical studies can 
be at least partially explained by the general opinion that transaction in transition 
countries, especially in the countries with less developed legal institutions like 
Russia are enforced mainly by informal mechanisms. Rapid development of 
informal institutions according to North (1990) should compensate the weaknesses 
of formal ones. If this is true the studies of governance mechanisms as classified by 
Williamson (1985) almost have no sense for countries in transition because informal 
enforcement tools are hardly observed by the researcher and common features of 
hierarchical, hybrid and market governance conceal the true enforcement which is 
preliminary informal.  
Fifteen years ago, authors in institutional economics and management expected 
that the development of enterprises in transition will be based on network-type 
informal contracts, with specific enforcement mechanisms, which do not rely on any 
formal institutions (Peng et al. 1996]. This approach was employed in order to 
explain the unsatisfactory outcomes of privatization in transition (first of all, in 
Russia). The lack of advantages of Russian privatized enterprises in productivity 
(Brown et al., 2006) was often interpreted in such a way that private ownership in 
Russia do not contribute to the improvement of productivity because formal 
ownership rights are not important in Russian context at all since property rights in 
Russia are based upon complex informal agreements. However many facts about 
contractual relations between enterprises in transition economies (including but not 
only Russia) contradict the theory of this development. Many empirical results 
support the view that formal enforcement mechanism matters for transaction 
economy and therefore governance structures also matters for organization of 
industries.  
 3
To conclude, recent studies of governance types in Russian industries are still 
incomplete. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. The second section provides brief review of the theoretical and empirical 
studies relevant for the subject. Next section is devoted to the data and methodology 
employed in the analysis. Sub-sections describe the characteristics of survey that 
provide the database for empirical analysis, .discuss the trends of development of 
governance models in the Russian industries, explains the hypothesis of the 
empirical analysis and variables constructed. Successive section contains the results 
of the hypothesis testing. The main results of the analysis are presented in 
conclusion.  
 
 
Governance structure in the studies of transition 
In spite of many empirical studies have shown extremely high role of informal in 
contrast to formal enforcement in transition countries both in the early stages of 
transition and recently (Johnson et al., 2002; Manolova et al, 2007), the idea of a 
greater role of informal relations and relational contracts as they described by 
Macaulay (1963) and Goldberg (1980) as an enforcement tool is not completely 
supported by neither empirical results nor the history of enterprise restructuring in 
Russia.  
Important lines of empirical analysis in the field are studies of trust and analysis 
of contract enforcement Raiser and co-authors (Raiser et al., 2008) reported not only 
that share of prepayment in the sales of enterprises in transition countries (as a 
measure of distrust) is higher than in countries with market economy, but also that 
the share of prepayment is higher in the countries with less speed and depth of 
transition processes and relatively poor contract enforcement. Paradoxically under 
the strong impact of path-dependence in contrast to developed legal rules market 
participants trust each other less. The authors explained the result by delineating 
different types of trust, including general trust and trust in close networks and 
concluding that it is the lack of general trust that prevents to supply the products on 
the conditions of trade credit. However this is not rather consistent with the opinion 
that exactly in the countries with least developed formal institutions (including 
Russia) networks based on personal trust should be more developed and partners in 
the networks should be loyal towards each other (since alternative supply and 
shipment contract is associated with higher transaction cost). Following this line we 
should expect higher discounts in inter-firm ties in Russia and since the most part of 
enterprises should be included in the inter-firm ties, higher discounts to traditional 
partners in general.  
Another important part of literature is devoted to enforcement mechanisms 
which employed by the firm in different transition countries. Studies of the guanxi in 
China are very indicative to Russia, since the system of guanxi is considered to be 
very close to the personal ties or blat and svyazi in Russia. During long time guanxi 
was considered as the main enforcement mechanism, of pure informal nature. 
However recent evidence shows that, first, guanxi are not very specific for modern 
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Chineese economy, since it is ‘utilitarian rather than emotional based entirely on the 
exchange of favor not on emotional attachment’ (Zhang et al, 2009). In this respect 
guanxi does not differ much from relational contracting in Western counttries. 
Second, modern empirical studies have shown that in course of business 
development guanxi is intensively replaced by formal complex contracts (Zhang et 
al, 2009; Zhou et al., 2008) and now for the most part of Chinese companies system 
of personal ties is complementary but not primarily as a tool of contract 
enforcement. In other words, specific enforcement tools in the most unusual 
transition country is not so specific that they would unable the analysis using 
traditional classification of governance mechanisms.  
Evidence of the Eastern European transition also shows that market participants 
extensively use enforcement tools traditional to any ‘normal’ country. According to 
Hendley and Murell (Hendley et al., 2003), firms in Romania (as an example of 
transition economy) rely on the protection by the law as an enforcement mechanism 
at least as often as on the incentives of partners to fulfil the contract (that is on pure 
relational contracts). Third-party enforcement (with the court as an important actor) 
or enforcement using legal institutions is developing and replacing informal 
enforcement.  
Development of Russian companies also stressed the importance of formal 
institutions as a necessary condition for restructuring. During last fifteen years 
modernization of a large part of Russian privatized enterprises occurred within the 
so-called holding company groups, or business groups, where authority is based 
upon property rights. Development of holding company groups reflected the desire 
of Russian businessmen to buy enterprises instead of establishment and/or 
maintenance of close cooperation with independent partners. Investment in 
enterprise restructuring along value chain were justified only under a hierarchical 
decision-making. This idea is clearly expressed in the name of the paragraph in most 
popular book devoted to the history of big business in Russia: “Property rights are 
the sole basis for consolidation of assets” (Pappe et al., 2009, p.96). In the book 
authors stressed many times that all the attempts to exercise restructuring and 
modernization under organization other than large companies governed by 
hierarchical control revealed to be unsuccessful.  
Business groups or holding company groups play an important role in re-
organization of Russian industries but the development of business groups is very 
indicative for understanding of transactional governance and enforcement 
mechanism in Russia. The development of groups in Russia explains the paradox of 
relatively stable legal boundaries of enterprises under transition (Murrrell, 2005). 
Like in many other transition countries (Stark, 1997), restructuring of assets was 
executed under the same legal structure but under the governance of a set of newly 
established firms where power of control and decision-making were concentrated. 
Although business groups in Russia are still very heterogeneous (Avdasheva., 2009), 
substantial part of them are large companies under very tough hierarchical control. 
In spite of high degree of diversification that should increase the cost of governance, 
subsidiaries in Russian business group demonstrate advantages vis-a-vis  
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independent businesses (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2004; Frye, 2004, Frye, 2005, 
Avdasheva, 2009). This evidence is interpreted as a support for the concept of 
comparative advantages of hierarchical control in transition countries. 
Finally, the failure of all the attempts of Russian government to support 
modernization based upon cooperation networks of enterprises also could be 
considered as justification of comparative advantages of hierarchical governance 
vis-à-vis market and/ or hybrid. Historically, the first attempt is connected with so-
called officially registered financial-industrial groups (FIGs). The necessary 
condition for government which was promised for the FIGs, was the implementation 
of joint project. About 100 groups of different size and industrial specialization were 
registered in 1997-2001, however almost none of projects planned was executed. In 
many cases groups failed to support internal discipline, because incentives for 
opportunistic decisions dominated the incentives for cooperative ones. Recent 
evidence on cluster organization in Russian regions is almost the same: strong 
interdependence of enterprises does not ensure the incentives for cooperation; own 
interests of every company prevail over the incentives of common objectives.  
However, it should be stressed that the failure of networks supported by 
government policies does not mean that relational contracts are absent in Russian 
economy. The ability of completely informal mechanism to support transaction 
revealed to be lower than it was expected at the beginning of transition, although it 
does not necessary mean that hybrid-type transaction governance are not employed.   
This remark is necessary especially keeping in mind the heterogeneity of hybrid-
type governance mechanisms. While relational contracts in Russia revealed to be in 
many cases unable to support contractual relationships, this conclusion does not 
apply to all forms of interaction between independent companies. For instance, 
modular organizations in many industries become the ground for effective 
restructuring (Avdasheva, 2007). 
Another important reason to analyze contractual governance in Russian 
industries is that different types of governance provide different incentives and 
opportunities for upgrading both of enterprises and industrial clusters. Modern 
theory of governance type in the value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005) analyzes the link 
between level of competitiveness and type of governance. Market, modular and 
relational types of governance are available if suppliers have enough capabilities to 
meet the requirements of buyer (in other words they are competitive enough). In 
contrast, captive governance and hierarchy emerge when buyer has to be involved in 
the upgrading of suppliers.  
In this context the study of governance in manufacturing industries can 
contribute not only to understanding of governance mechanisms and contract 
enforcement in transition but also to the broad range of research devoted to 
determinants of modernization in the sector of Russian economy, where producers 
are less competitive in the global market.  
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Analysis of the governance models in Russian industries: data and 
methodology  
 
Survey of manufacturing enterprises   
This paper is based on the results of a survey of top managers of 957 large and 
medium-sizes enterprises of 8 industries (manufacturing of food products, including 
beverages and tobacco, manufacturing of textile and textile products, manufacturing 
of wood and wood products, manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products, 
manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, manufacture of machine 
and equipment, manufacture of electrical and optical equipment, manufacture of 
transport equipment) carried out in 2009 by the Analytical Centre of Yuri Levada. 
This survey represents the second wave of the competitiveness survey of the 
Institute of Industrial and Market Studies, Higher School of Economics. The first 
wave survey was conducted in the framework of joint project with World Bank. 
More than half of the respondents constitutes panel sample.  
Entities with the number of employees less than 100 (in 2005) and more than 10 
000 are intentionally excluded from the sample. The enterprises of the sample were 
employ about 8% of an average number of employees in manufacturing and produce 
about 6% of manufacturing product in Russia. The sample is biased towards more 
profitable enterprises (except those in manufacture of basic metal and fabricated 
metal products), but the dynamics of employment and revenue is generally 
consistent with trends in Russian manufacturing as a whole.  
The survey is not devoted to the transaction governance but to the 
competitiveness and it’s determinants as general subjects. This fact limits the 
possibilities to analyze governance choices but at the same time provides 
opportunity to employ different performance indicators.  
 
Is there a choice of governance type for Russian enterprises? Evidence 
from the sample 
 
Before proposing and testing hypotheses about the impact of the type of governance 
on the behavior of enterprises in the first place, it is necessary to make sure that 
Russian enterprises have a choice of suppliers and buyers. An important feature of 
the Soviet system of production was the absence of competing suppliers and buyers 
for any given company. Most manufacturers were ‘locked-in’ the bilateral 
relationships, which created specific to the Soviet, and later for transition type of 
bargaining power. It is prevailing of stable bilateral contracts where parties are 
unable to change partners and therefore a risk of quasi-rent expropriation was the 
essence of ‘specific monopoly power in Russian industries’. In the framework of 
stable bilateral links the very attempt to analyze the strategies of enterprises on the 
choice of supply and distribution channels (that is governance type) would be 
unproductive. Restructuring of governance both on the sides of supply and sales is 
complicated by the fact that it must occur simultaneously with the development of 
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markets for technology-related stages of the value chain. This problem remains to be 
acute not only for manufacturing enterprises but also for their customers. In order to 
be able to choose the best supplier it is necessary to have competition between 
potential suppliers.  
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2002 (for respondents) 2009 (for respondents) 2009 (assessment of respondents for 
their customers) 
Fig.1. Assessment of the difficulties to change suppliers (easy, difficult or impossible), % of respondents: white segments 
correspond with the answer „it is easy“, grey segment with answer „it is difficult“ and black segment with answer 
„impossible“.  
It is unlikely that any data will allow conclusions about the level of competition 
sufficient to restructure the governance in the value chain. However the survey data 
allow us to compare the intensity of competition in the industries in 2009 and seven 
years before (in 2002). As we can see (Figure 1), during seven years between 
surveys the share of enterprises, who consider the change of suppliers impossible, 
decreased substantially. On the other hand, number of enterprises, for whom the 
change of supplier is easy, has increased more than twice. Assessment of switching 
cost for enterprises as buyers does not differ from the assessment of switching cost 
for their customers (Figure 1, right graph): less than 10% of respondents regard 
themselves as the only possible supplier for their customers. In general, the data on 
the assessment of switching cost allow us to analyze the restructuring of supply and 
sale channels as available for Russian enterprises and therefore the type of 
governance as a result of choice, but not the links inherited from allocation of 
production under socialism. Another result of survey important for the analysis of 
transactionf governance is the data of the changes in internal structure of the 
enterprises. As already stated, restructuring of supply and sales organization goes 
hand in hand with the changes of internal structure of the enterprises. Comparing the 
answers on the question about the plans to create or to divest any divisions from the 
enterprise in 2005 and 2009 we can see, firstly, that considerable part of the 
respondents had plan to change the bundle of the activities included in the 
boundaries of legal entity; secondly, that the number of respondents who want to 
include certain activity in the boundaries of the enterprises both in 2005 and 2009 
exceeds the number of those who would like to spin-off divisions, and thirdly, that 
under the influence of negative demand shock the plans of divestments become 
more popular among the entrepreneurs. In any case, changes of the internal structure 
of the enterprises indicate the restructuring of the model of transaction governance.         
 
 
  
17%
83%
Want to spin-off:
Yes
No
45%55%
Want to create
Yes
No
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Fig.2. Share of respondents those want to include or exclude any divisions from the internal 
structure of enterprises, % of respondents, for 2005 above, for 2009 below 
Source: authors’ calculations based on survey data  
 
 
The evidence of how Russian enterprises adjust their ‘make or buy’ decisions 
(Figure 2) shows that large part of managers are not satisfied by the combination of 
activities within the enterprises. As we can see, almost half of respondents want to 
expand set of activities within enterprise. The share of those who want to divest 
several activities is lower, although it grows substantially to 2009 in comparison 
with 2005. Of course, we should not forget that economic crisis made directors 
thinking about the possibilities and advantages of outsourcing. It is difficult to 
conclude how the development of the market contributed to the incentives to buy 
certain product and services instead to produce them.  
At the same time, we can clearly see (Figure 3) that the plans of Russian 
companies to change the boundaries of the firm reflect the trend of competition in 
the markets and the determinants of transaction costs in the contracts (Williamson, 
1985). Enterprises want to get rid of those activities, whose services are available on 
the markets and the purchasing of which does not involve high transaction costs. 
The evident examples are energy generation, construction and transportation 
services. In contrast, companies express a need to expand forward, to create the 
kinds of activities, which are associated with specific investments (design of new 
product for given enterprise, R&D specific for given enterprise) and at the same 
time which allow enterprise to move downstream in the value chain (assembling).  
47%53%
Want to create
Yes
No
25%
75%
Want to spin-off:
Yes
No
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Fig.3. Divisions (activities) inside the enterprise, which respondents want to include or 
exclude, % of respondents 
Source: authors’ calculations based on survey data  
 
In summary, sample surveys showed on the one hand, increasing competition in 
Russian markets, on the other hand, changes of the internal structure of enterprises. 
Both processes, in our view, indicate that lock-ins in the traditional relations are 
replaced by the possibility of consciously building new value chain. This enables us 
to analyze the incentives of choice of governance arrangements, considering their 
impact on behavior and performance of enterprises.  
 
Classification of the governance types  
For classification of governance types (Figure 4) we used set of characteristics of 
enterprise, including:  
• the company's structure (a set of enterprises of different types of activities, 
from production of raw materials to retailers);  
• the share of shipments of enterprise within the company (inside the same 
business);  
• the share of largest  buyer in the volume of shipments; 
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•  type of relationship with suppliers of raw materials. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Classification of governance types  
 
All the characteristics of enterprises are drawn from the answers on questions of 
sample survey. The classification used several simplifying assumptions. The first 
assumption was that we can qualify governance type using the responses of one 
participant in the transaction. The second was that one enterprise can be attributed 
only to one type of governance in the chain. To reduce the errors associated with the 
second assumption, relatively rigid criteria to identify the type of governance were 
employed. As a result, we could not accurately identify a group of companies 
involved in the captive governance, while allowing a good representation of this 
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group. That is why we abandoned the investigation of this type of governance in 
further analysis. Summing up, the classification employed in the research is in great 
extent arbitrary. To diminish the possible mistakes we use a number of hypotheses 
to check that enterprises using given type of transaction behave according the 
implication of institutional economics. If enterprise classified as governed in the 
hierarchical transaction exhibit the typical feature of the participant in hierarchical 
transaction this would support the reliability of our classification.  
 
Hypotheses on the role of different governance types in Russian 
industries and impact of governance types on strategies and 
performance of enterprises 
 
The literature review shows that it is worthwhile to discuss six hypotheses regarding 
the role of different governance types in Russian manufacturing:   
H1. The structure of Russia's manufacturing sector, in terms of governance 
types, is bipolar: the majority of enterprises is involved in market transaction or 
hierarchy. The share of hybrid-type transaction is not significant, including both 
transaction supported by buyer (modular governance) and supported by mutual 
incentives to behave cooperatively (relational governance). This hypothesis is based 
both on studies of largest Russian companies in the extractive sectors, and on the 
experiences of industrial policy both on federal and regional level, which requires 
co-operation between enterprises. 
H2. There is a connection between the type of transaction governance and model 
of governance in the company. The higher is the role of disciplining mechanisms 
using by the buyer towards supplier, the less is room for opportunism of managers 
towards the owners in the company the more profitable divergence of management 
from ownership in given company. This means that share of participants in 
relational governance (where it is hard or impossible to codify transactions between 
participants), which employ model of management converged with ownership 
should be higher than in the companies participating in modular relationships (where 
codification of transactions is relatively easy).   
H3. Participants in different types of transactions have different attitudes towards 
price and non-price competition:  
H3.1. Market governance implies relatively low transaction cost for the 
participants. That is why the share of prepayment as a measure of distrust (Raiser et 
al., 2008) under market transactions should be the lowest.  
H3.2. In every type of governance there is a transaction cost associated with 
confirmation of quality. However, the preferred tool to confirm quality depends on 
the type of buyer. Suppliers in modular transactions should prefer ISO certification 
in contrast to brand name.   
H4. The enterprises within hierarchies have higher investment on the level of 
enterprises (with high level of specificity). The hypothesis is based on institutional 
theory of integration as a mean to protect specific investment (Williamson, 1985).  
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H5. Enterprises within hierarchies should have higher probabilities to upgrade, 
however not higher competitiveness. The hypothesis reflects the theory of 
governance in the value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005), where strong control of buyer 
over suppliers is a condition for upgrading, when suppliers capabilities are not high 
enough.  
H6. Hierarchies protect enterprises from the uncertainty and risks, and therefore 
the participants in hierarchical transactions have lower assessment of adverse events 
in the future. This should be true both for opportunism of partners in transactions 
and for trends in performance. Participants in relational (but not modular) 
transactions evaluate risks of partners’ opportunist as highest. The hypothesis is 
based on the conclusion made by Williamson (1990) that hybrid mechanism of 
transactional governance is most vulnerable for opportunism and on the findings of 
studies of Russian companies that affiliation to business groups (i.e. big companies) 
protect participants from transaction cost (Frye, 2004; Frye, 2005).    
 
Variables employed in the analysis  
For analysis we employed a range of variables, mostly based on the answer of the 
respondents in the survey. The most important groups of variables are:  
1. Industry variables. Industry variables reflect eight industries listed above. In all 
the regression base industry is manufacturing of food products, including 
beverages and tobacco.  
2. Size variable. For size variable in the subsequent analysis we use variable 
defined as LN of number of employment in 2008 (annual average).  
3. Ownership variables. Many empirical studies have shown that ownership 
structure (especially the presence of state among the owners) is very important 
to explain many features of enterprise performance and behavior in transition 
economy. In the analysis we employ the variable ST_OWN that takes value 1 if 
state (on federal or regional level) possesses the shares of the enterprises and 0 
otherwise. Correspondingly, enterprises of other organizational forms than 
incorporations are excluded from the analysis.  
4. Model of corporate control. Important feature of Russian corporate sector is 
widespread participation of controlling owners in day-to-day management of 
the enterprises. Model of corporate control (conversions and correspondingly 
divergence of ownership and management) provides strong impact on 
organization and strategies of companies (Dolgopyatova, 2009). To reflect the 
corporate control organization we used indicator proposed by Dolgopyatova 
(2009). The indicator DIVERG takes the value 0 if there is no sign of ownership 
and control convergence (owners do not participate in management, managers 
do not own share of company) and 1 otherwise.  
5. Age of enterprises. In the transition economy like Russia the age of enterprises is 
more important to explain organization and behavior. We can assume that 
enterprises founded before liberalization reform are under the stronger influence 
of path-dependence. That should affect many aspects of organization and 
behavior of business. We use indicator NEW_ENT that takes the value 1 if 
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enterprise is founded after 1990 (that is in the period of liberalization) and 0 
otherwise.  
6. Location variables. Location is important feature of business in every country. 
But in Russia the influence of location on the organization and behavior of 
enterprises is higher because of the uneven impact of competition and 
globalization across big country. Several papers have shown that location in 
agglomeration (and competition associated with wider market and more 
competitors) forced enterprises to restructure rapidly. We employ indicator 
AGGLOM  which takes the value 1 if enterprise is located in agglomeration and 
0 otherwise. Enterprise was defined as it belongs to agglomeration if it is 
located in the city or not far than 50 km from the city.    
7. Competition and switching cost variable. We employed two variables those to 
our mind reflects competition. The variable COMPET takes the value 1 if 
enterprise responds in the survey that it is affected by competition on the market 
and 0 otherwise. The variable SW_C is constructed using the answers of 
respondents on the question how is difficult for customers to find new suppliers. 
The value 0 corresponds to the answer “easy”, the value 1 to the answer 
“difficult” and 2 – “impossible”.  
8. Terms of shipment variable. The variable is constructed on the base of the 
answers of respondents about the share of trade credit in shipment (in percent) 
and the share of prepayment correspondingly. To measure the willingness for 
price competition (or alternatively, transaction cost or trust for customers, see 
below) we use the variable NET_CRED difference between the share of trade 
credit and prepayment (in percent).    
9. Quality confirmation variables. We use two variables those reflect quality 
confirmation as a tool of non-price competition and they are brand name 
(BRAND) and certification of production and management according to 
international standards (ISO). Variable BRAND takes value 1 if enterprise 
developed brand name (according to respondent) and 0 otherwise. Variable ISO 
takes value 1 if enterprise certified processes or products according to 
international standards and 0 otherwise.  
10. Investment variables. As investment variables we take several indicators which 
reflect cost of enterprises in order to upgrade technologies. Common feature of 
all the variables is that investment cost on the level of enterprise exhibit some 
degree of irreversibility, they are sunk cost at least partly. Corresponding 
variables are: LEAN (takes value 1 if enterprise introduced system of lean 
production and 0 otherwise); INV (according to respondent, enterprise 
undertook investment in 2005-2008 substantial investments (value 2), minor 
investments (value 1) or no investments (value 0); R&D (takes value 1 if 
enterprise spent money on R&D in 2005-2008 and 0 otherwise); EQUIP (takes 
value 1 if enterprise purchased equipment in 2005-2008 and 0 otherwise); 
TECH (takes value 1 if enterprise purchased technologies in 2005-2008 and 0 
otherwise); TRAIN (takes value 1 if enterprise spent money in 2005-2008 for 
training of employees in order to improve or renew product and 0 otherwise).  
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11. Upgrading benchmarking variables. Upgrading variables are constructed based 
on the answers on the question “Please assess, how did competitiveness of the 
enterprise change during 2005-2008 in comparison with the main competitors” 
with variants “lagged behind and the gap increased” (0), “lagged behind but the 
gap reduced” (1), “gap with the competitors remained to be the same” (2) and 
“we kept leading positions” (3). The benchmarking questions were asked about 
domestic (∆COMP_S_D) and foreign competitors (∆COMP_S_F). 
12. Contract risks and contract protection variables. To assess estimations of 
contract risks respondents were asked a question “Please evaluate the 
importance of the unfair competition as a threat to your business”. Variable 
UN_C takes the value 1 if the problem of unfair competition is serious or likely 
serious and the value 0 if this problem is of minor importance or is not 
important at all. To assess contract protection respondents answered the 
question: “Do you agree that in the case of disputes with other commercial 
organizations you [enterprise] can protect your rights in the court”. Variable 
CON_PR takes the value 1 if respondent agrees or almost agree with the 
statement and 0 if respondents disagrees or almost disagrees.  
13. Risk of adverse performance variable was constructed using the answer on the 
question “How do you assess the probability of bankruptcy of the enterprise in 
nearest two-three years?” The variable takes the value 2 if according to 
respondent bankruptcy according to respondent is very likely, value 1 if 
bankruptcy is possible and 0  if bankruptcy is impossible.    
Descriptive statistics for variables employed is presented in the Table 1. 
Unfortunately response rate is different for different questions and this explains the 
uneven numbers of observation for different variables and regressions.  
 
Variables N Mean/proportion Median 
Industry variables (proportions of enterprises in the 
following industries) 
   
   food products 754 0.25 0 
   textile & textile products 754 0.10 0 
   wood & wood products  754 0.08 0 
   chemicals & chemical products 754 0.10 0 
   basic metals & fabricated metal products 754 0.10 0 
   electrical & optical equipment 754 0.12 0 
   transport equipment  754 0.09 0 
   machine  & equipment 754 0.16 0 
Average number of employees 754 607 300 
Proportion of enterprises with state ownership 
(ST_OWN) 
632 0.32 0 
Proportion of enterprises with diverged ownership 
and management (DIVERG) 
668 0.42 0 
Proportion of enterprises founded after 1990 
(NEW_ENT) 
754 0.27 0 
Proportion of enterprises located in the 656 0.33 0 
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agglomerations (AGGLOM) 
Proportion of enterprises mentioned competition in 
the product markets (COMPET) 
754 0.78 1 
Assessment of customer’s  switching cost (SW_C) 753 0.72 1 
Share of trade credit in shipment minus share of 
prepayment in shipment 
734 -5.73 0 
Proportion of enterprises developed brand name 
(BRAND) 
754 0.34 0 
Proportion of enterprises certified processes and 
products under international standards (ISO) 
754 0.49 0 
Assessment of investments made by enterprises 
during 2005-2008 (INV) 
739 1.13 1 
Proportion of enterprises developed lean production 
(LEAN) 
754 0.23 0 
Proportion of enterprises spent money on R&D in 
2005-2008 (R&D) 
754 0.74 1 
Proportion of enterprises bought equipment during 
2005-2008 (EQUIP) 
754 0.62 1 
Proportion of enterprises bought technologies during 
2005-2008 (TECH) 
754 0.23 0 
Proportion of enterprises trained employees in order 
to improve or renew product (TRAIN) 
754 0.52 1 
Proportion of enterprises estimated the problem of 
unfair competition is serious or likely serious 
(UN_C) 
754 0.43 0 
Proportion of enterprises consider themselves to be 
able to protect their interests in the disputes with 
other commercial organizations (CON_PR) 
720 0.27 0 
Assessment of probability of bankruptcy in the 
nearest two-three years (BABK) 
676 0.93 1 
 
Tab 1. Descriptive statistics for selected variables  
Source: authors’ calculation using the survey results.  
 
Variables which reflect type of governance mechanisms are explained in the 
previous sections.  
 
The role of governance type in Russian manufacturing 
Distribution of manufacturing enterprises across types of governance 
We managed to classify 771 of 957 enterprises, representing 81% of the initial 
sample. The results do not support hypothesis H1 (Figure 5). The enterprises in the 
sample were found to be involved in different types of governance mechanisms. The 
largest group of enterprises participates not in hierarchical, but in market model of 
transaction (that means that enterprises do not sell products to final consumers, and 
sales are distributed among many buyers). This finding contradicts to the wide-
spread notion that vertically integrated companies (either one legal entity or 
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organized as a group of separate legal entities under common control) prevail in 
Russian industries. Conclusions on the share and role of vertical integrated 
businesses should be adjusted in respect of manufacturing (in contrast to extracting) 
industries. On the other hand, evidence contradicts to the suggestion that any hybrid 
transaction is considered by Russian enterprises as unprofitable and as associated 
with high risk of quasi-rent seizure. 
 
 
Fig.5. Distribution of manufacturing enterprises across different type of governance 
Source: authors’ calculations based on survey data  
 
Transaction and corporate governance 
The data supports the hypothesis H2. Within the group of enterprises participating in 
hybrid transaction a statistically significant difference is observed between the 
enterprises involved in the modular and relational type of governance (Figure 6): in 
the first sub-group the convergence of ownership and control is observed in 56% of 
the respondents, whereas in the second - in 70% of the enterprises. The enterprise, 
whose management is carried out under modular mechanism of transaction 
governance, a set of managerial decisions is limited and therefore the scope for 
principal-agent problem and agency cost are also limited. In contrast, for enterprises 
involved in relational-type transactions the managerial decisions are more difficult 
because they should take in account not only the goals of the owners but also 
interests and incentives of partners. As a result, the control of owners over 
managerial decisions requires more resources and convergence of ownership and 
management becomes more advantageous.    
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Fig.6. Share of enterprises with converged ownership and management, % of 
respondents 
 
Transaction governance and price competition  
The hypothesis H3.1 is supported. Participants of market transactions have 
substantially higher share of trade credit and lower share of prepayment in sales than 
participants of every other type of transaction (see Table 2). However this result 
should be interpreted in two ways: as an evidence of lower transaction cost and 
higher abilities to enforce contracts (the same characteristics of transaction which 
make market coordination preferable), and as an evidence of more intense 
competition. It should be stressed that these two explanations do not exclude each 
other.  
It is interesting to compare results obtained with those reported by Raiser (Raiser 
et al, 2008). Using BEEPs data for 2002 authors revealed a lower share of trade 
credit that in our sample. According to BEEPs data in 2002 the difference between 
share of trade credit and prepayment in sales of Russian enterprises was about -20% 
(about 40% of sales on the terms of prepayment and 20% - trade credit). In our 
sample for 2009 the average share of prepayment was almost the same however the 
share of trade credit is much higher – about 35%. Comparing the data we should 
keep in mind the difference of macroeconomic environment. For Russian 
manufacturing 2002 was the year of rapid growth and therefore less intensive 
competition, while 2009 is the period of production decline and increasing 
competition. Prepayments and trade credits are explained by trust (i.e. transaction 
cost) as well as by many other determinants. However the sharp difference between 
participants in different types of transaction takes place and illustrates the impact of 
transaction cost on the choice of governance model.  
 
 
 
 20
Sample All enterprises Independent 
enterprises 
Subsidiaries of 
holding companies 
CONSTANT 26.10* 
(1.93) 
26.51** 
(1.96) 
19.11 
(1.17) 
19.91 
(1.22) 
55.81** 
(2.22) 
54.60** 
(2.16) 
HIERARCHY 2.53  
(0.39) 
3.82 
(0.59) 
0.74  
(0.08) 
0.80 
(0.09) 
5.74 
(0.54) 
5.28 
(0.50) 
HYBRID -10.26* 
(-1.93) 
 -12.27** 
(-2.02) 
 5.42 
(0.49) 
 
MODULAR  -13.45** 
(-2.30) 
 -14.66** 
(-2.20) 
 0.01  
(0.00) 
RELATIONAL  -2.00 
(-0.48) 
 -7.33 
(-0.88) 
 17.30 
(1.05) 
SIZE 0.12  
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.05) 
1.37 
(0.53) 
1.29 
(0.50) 
-6.58 
(-1.64) 
-6.39 
(-1.59) 
INDSUTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ST_OWN -14.73*  
(-1.95) 
-15.43**  
(-2.04) 
-11.12  
(-1.28) 
-11.60 
(-1.33) 
-21.58 
(-1.37) 
-23.03  
(-1.46) 
NEW_ENT 13.18  
(1.53) 
14.34* 
(1.66) 
17.72* 
(1.73) 
18.46* 
(1.80) 
1.96 
(0.12) 
4.17 
(0.25) 
COMP 16.15*** 
(2.90) 
15.52** 
(2.78) 
13.91** 
(2.08) 
13.29** 
(1.98) 
31.32*** 
(3.05) 
30.84*** 
(2.99) 
N 622 622 443 443 179 179 
F-statistics 15.01*** 14.08*** 9.98*** 9.31*** 6.74*** 6.32*** 
R2  adjusted 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.30 
Dependent variable: share of trade credit minus share of prepayments in shipments  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level. 
 
Tab. 2. Terms of sales of product produced: impact of governance type (OLS 
regression) 
 
Governance type and confirmation of quality 
The hypothesis H3.1 is also confirmed (see Table 3). The ways to confirm quality 
are selected depending on the type of buyer: enterprise targeting only a qualified 
buyer makes the choice in favor of ISO certification, as opposed to the development 
of the trademark. It is typical for participants in modular and partially in relational 
transactions. Within the hierarchies the need to confirm or to signal quality is lower, 
since parties under the same control have direct means to provide the necessary 
quality of products. In turn, modular governance is characterized by high ability to 
codify terms of transaction by buyers and that is why ISO certification represents 
not only important tools to comply with established standards of quality but also 
more preferable in comparison with brand name. Moreover, under modular 
transactions brand name is kept by buyer not by suppliers, and this is the way to 
prevent upgrading of suppliers and to re-distribute the incomes towards governing 
element in the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
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Dependent variables 
- way of quality 
confirmation  
BRAND name  
(1 – yes, 0 – no)  
ISO certification  
(1- yes, 0 – no)  
 
HIERARCHY - - - - 
HYBRID -***  +**  
MODULAR  -***  +* 
RELATIONAL  -  +* 
SIZE  +*** +*** +*** +*** 
COMP +** +*   
ST_OWN -** -**   
INDUSTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 631 631 753 753 
-2Log likelihood 751.34 749.02 903.44 903.34 
R2 Nagelkerke  0.12 0.13 0.23 0.23 
Test of the model χ2 58.25*** 60.58*** 140.33*** 140.43*** 
Only signs of coefficients and significance (according to Wald-statistics) are reported 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level. 
 
Tab. 3. Investments in brand name and ISO certification: impact of governance type 
(binary logistic regression) 
 
 
Governance type and investments  
The analysis also confirmed the hypothesis H4. Whatever the indicator of 
investment at the enterprise level has been used - such as assessment of amount of 
investment by respondents (no investments/minor investment/ significant investment 
during the period 2005-2008), introduction of lean production, R & D funding in 
2005-2008, purchase of new machinery and equipment in order to introduce new 
products, purchasing new technology or training personnel in order to introduce new 
products during the same period – participants in hierarchies have higher chance to 
implement these costs (see Table 4). We interpret this result as an evidence of 
specific investment protection, since investments on the level of enterprise are rather 
specific. It should be stressed that the comparative advantages of participants in 
vertical integrated companies in the survey correspond with the results of many 
other survey reporting higher productivity and better economic and financial 
performance of enterprises within holding company groups in Russia (see 
Avdasheva, 2009 for survey).      
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Dependent 
variables - sunk 
investments 
indicators   
LEANa INVb R&Da EQUIPa TECHa TRAINa 
Hierarchy +*** +*** +*  +* +** 
 
+** 
 
Hybrid + + - + + + 
SIZE  +** +*** +*** +***  +*** +*** 
COMP   +** +*   
ST_OWN  -*     
DIVERG  -**     
INDUSTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 753 568 753 753 753 753 
-2Log likelihood 786.10 1137.19 716.75 953.23 758.98 989.54 
R2 Nagelkerke  0.06 0.14 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.09 
Test of the model 
χ2 
30.40*** 77.22*** 154.98**
* 
49.60*** 57.51*** 54.04*** 
aBinary logistic regression  
b Ordinal regression  
Only signs of coefficients and significance (according to Wald-statistics) are reported 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4. Specific investments: impact of governance type 
 
Governance mechanisms and upgrading of the enterprise 
Hypothesis 5 is also confirmed. Table 5 reports the result of ordinal regression, 
where dependent variables reflect the probability to upgrade. Benchmarking both 
with domestic and foreign competitors shows the progress of participants in 
hierarchies and relational transaction.  
 
 ∆COMP_S_D ∆COMP_S_F 
HIERARCHY +*** + *** +* +* 
HYBRID +**  +*  
RELATIONAL  + ***  + 
MODULAR  +  +** 
SIZE  +* +* +* +* 
INDUSTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DIVERG -*** -*** -** -*** 
N 538 538 368 368 
-2Log likelihood 930,82 967,31 774,33 801,97 
R2 Nagelkerke  0,16 0,17 0,14 0,14 
Test of the model χ2 85,63*** 89,78*** 52,18*** 52,97*** 
Only signs of coefficients and significance (according to Wald-statistics) are reported 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Assessment of upgrading: impact of governance type (ordinal regression)  
 
The first result perfectly corresponds to the theory of value chain governance 
(Gereffi et al, 2005): hierarchies serve to promote upgrading when capabilities of 
suppliers are limited. The second result (higher probability to upgrade of participants 
in relational transactions) requires further analysis and interpretation.  
It should be stressed however that the results of comparison of directions of 
competitiveness changes and obtained level of competitiveness differ. Participants in 
market transactions have higher share of sales abroad (+7-8 percentage points in 
comparison of enterprises within hierarchies and +10 percentage points in 
comparison with participants in modular and relational transactions) , as an indicator 
of competitiveness. Other interesting result in the survey is that under negative 
macroeconomic shock in 2008 enterprises involved in market governance was the 
only group that demonstrates substantial increase of production in comparison with 
previous year. This finding again supports the concept of dependence between level 
of competitiveness obtained and the choice of governance mechanisms. Participants 
in market transactions appear to be more resistant to negative demand shock and 
more competitive in the international markets. This result is especially interesting 
because in general manufacturing industries in Russia demonstrate relatively low 
competitiveness and enterprises rarely sold something abroad. 
 
Governance mechanisms and contract risk assessments    
Assessment both of contract risks and probability of bad performance by 
respondents does not perfectly support the hypothesis H6 and underlying theory (see 
Table 6). Perfectly consistent with Williamson (1985) participants in relational (but 
not in modular) transactions assess the chances to suffer from unfair competition as 
highest. This result reflects the trade-off for participants in relational exchanges: the 
concept of quasi-rent means both large surplus from transaction with given party 
(that serves to discipline participants of transaction) and probability of high losses 
when partner behaves opportunistically. According to the results obtained directors 
of enterprises understand this trade-off well. 
The assessment of probability to protect contract rights in the courts also 
supports the concept of hierarchical and hybrid transactions as a forms of contract 
precautions. Enterprises participating in hierarchical and hybrid mechanisms 
consider their chances to protect contract rights in the courts higher, than 
participants in market transactions. At the same time this result contradicts to the 
opinion that participants in market transactions feel more trust to the buyers and\or 
their contracts are associated with lower transactions costs (Raiser et al., 2008). 
According to our results higher trade credit rate in the revenue reflects not higher 
trust but just more intensive competition the participants in market deals face. 
One of significant results is that hierarchical mechanism are associated with highest 
chances of firm’s bankruptcy in the midterm. This results can be interpreted in 
different ways: one is that high assessment of probability of bad performance and 
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bankruptcy reflects relatively low competitiveness of suppliers, as it is articulated 
under value chain theory  (Gereffi et al., 2005). 
 
 UN_Ca CON_PRa BANKb 
HIERARCHY - - +** +** +* +* 
HYBRID +  +***  -  
MODULAR  +  +**  - 
RELATIONAL  +***  +**  - 
INDUSTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIZE - - +** +** -* -* 
AGGL - - -*** -*** -** -* 
SW_C -** -** - -   
ST_OWN     -** -** 
N 668 668 644 644 527 527 
-2Log likelihood 882.57 876.17 713.73 713.73 761.02 793.66 
R2 Nagelkerke  0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Test of the model χ2 25.28** 31.68*** 33.74*** 33.74*** 36.66*** 36.70*** 
aBinary logistic regression  
bOrdinal regression  
Only signs of coefficients and significance (according to Wald-statistics) are reported 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6. Assessment of contract risks and probabilities of bad performance: impact 
of governance type  
  
 
 
Conclusions 
Results of the analysis of governance types based on the data from a sample survey 
of companies showed the following:  
1. In Russian manufacturing there are all types of governance between 
suppliers and buyers. The hypothesis on the larger share of enterprises involved in 
hierarchies is not confirmed. Moreover, increasing competition and modernization 
of internal structures of enterprises allow to hope that diversification of governance 
structures will also increase.  
2. Model of governance of external (inter-firm) contracts and model of 
governance on the level of company are interrelated. The question requires further 
analysis. Empirical results show that disciplining tools in the relations between firm 
and within the firms can substitute each other. In enterprises, which participate in 
transaction with high disciplining role by buyer, the conditions for divergence of 
ownership from management arise.  
3. Market governance is associated with lower transaction cost and more trust 
in relations with buyers, if we interpret prepayments as an indicator of distrust, in 
contrast to trade credits.   
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4. The way to confirm quality of product depends on type of governance. 
When transactions allow codification and buyer plays important role in setting a 
quality standards (i.e. under modular governance) certification according to 
international standards is preferable in comparison with investment in brand name. 
5. Hypothesis on protection of investments within hierarchies are fully 
confirmed.  Enterprises in the hierarchies demonstrate higher probabilities to carry 
specific investments during 2005-2008.   
6. Enterprises under hierarchical control within value chain demonstrate 
higher chances to upgrade in comparison with both domestic and foreign 
competitors. At the same time they do not outperform participants of market 
governance in terms of comparative competitiveness obtained, judging by the share 
of sales abroad in the volume of shipment. This result confirms both the notion of 
hierarchies as an instrument to ensure upgrading when both capabilities of suppliers 
and ability of buyer to codify transactions are low, and numerous results of analysis 
of subsidiaries in the business groups in Russia, which more often show increase of 
productivity but do not outperform enterprises outside business groups in terms of 
productivity achieved (Avdasheva, 2009).  
7. Assessment of short-run and medium-run risks by the enterprises is only 
partly predicted by institutional theory as well as theory of value chain. Completely 
in line with institutional theory, enterprises in hybrid transactions (more precisely, in 
relational one) are expected to suffer from opportunism in the form of unfair 
competition more likely. Enterprises in the market transactions consider the chances 
to protect contract rights in the court as lowest in comparison with other groups. 
Surprisingly, companies in the hierarchies expected the probability of bankruptcy as 
the highest among all other groups.  
To conclude, empirical analysis generally supports the hypotheses developed by 
value chain analysis as a theory of competitiveness and firms’ behavior under 
different models of governance. We can therefore expect that the classification of 
the Russian enterprises according to the models of governance structure and 
assessment of shares of different models of governance are more or less reliable. 
One important for both theoretical discussions and further research result is the deep 
difference between ‘modular’ and ‘relational’ sub-types of hybrid governance 
mechanism. Another result is that mechanisms of contract enforcement which can be 
observed by the researchers affect the organization and strategies of the enterprises.  
 
Acknowledgements  
This research has been supported by Scientific Foundation of Higher School of Economics 
(State University). The authors express gratitude to Maria Yudkevich, Russell Pittmann,  
Polina Kryuchkova, Victoria Golikova, Tatiana Dolgopyatova, Boris Kuznetsov, Andrei 
Yakovlev, Ma Ying and Ning Zhong and to other participants of the discussion on this paper 
at the International Conference ”On Economic and Social Development” held by SU-HSE in 
April 2010,  at the seminar “Institutional Problems of the Russian Economy” in March 2010, 
at Chinese-Russian seminar “Transition of Economic Development in China and Russia” held 
 26
in Moscow, at Higher School of Economics (May 31-June 1 2010) and during Laboratory of 
Institutional Analysis, Higher School of Economics summer school in July 2010.  
 
References  
Avdasheva, S (2009), “Impact of Business Integration on Corporate Restructuring and 
Performance” in  Dolgopyatova, T., Iwasaki, I., Yakvlev, A. (Eds) Organization and 
Development of Russian Business: A Firm-Level Analysis, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 213-234. 
Avdasheva, S. (2007), “The Russian Furniture Industry: Firms' Upgrading According to the 
Value-Chain Theory”, Competition and Change, 11(4): 307-328. 
Blanchard, O., Kremer, M. (1997), “Disorganization”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112(4): 1091-1126. 
Brown, D.J., Earle, J.S., Telegdy, A. (2006), “The Productivity Effects of Privatisation: 
Longitudinal Estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 114(1): 61-99. 
Dolgopyatova, T. (2009), “Stock Ownership and Corporate Control” in Dolgopyatova, T., 
Iwasaki, I., Yakvlev, A. (Eds) Organization and Development of Russian Business: A 
Firm-Level Analysis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 39-61. 
Frye, T. (2004), “Credible Commitments and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia” 
American Political Science Review, 3(98): 453 – 466. 
Frye, T. (2005), Original Sin, Good Work and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence from a 
Survey Experiment, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series. WP No 811. 
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The Governance of Global Value Chains”, 
Review of International Political Economy, 12(1): 78–104.  
Goldberg, V. (1980), “Relational Exchange, Economics and Complex Contracts”, American 
Behavioral Scientist, 23 (3): 337 – 352. 
Guriev, S., Rachinsky, A. (2005), “The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19 (1): 131-150.   
Hendley, K., Murrell, P. (2003), “Which Mechanism Support the Fulfillment of Sales 
Agreement? Asking Decision-Makers in Firms”, Economic Letters 78 (1): 49-54.  
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff C. (2002), “Courts and Relational Contracts”, Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 18 (1): 221-277.  
Kaplinsky, R., Morris, M. (2003), Handbook for Value Chain Research. Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Macaulay, S. (1963), “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study,”American Sociological Review 28 (1): 55–67. 
Manolova T.S., Gyoshev, B.S., Manev I. M. (2007), “The Role of Impersonal Trust for 
Entrepreneurial Exchange in a Transition Economy”, International Journal of Emerging 
Markets 2(2): 107-122. 
Menard, C. (2004), “The Economics of Hybrid Organizations”, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics , 160 (3): 345-376.  
Murrell P. (2005) Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies. in: Menard C., Shirley M. 
(eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Kluwer Academic Press. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: 
Norton.  
Pappe, Ya., Galukhina, Ya. (2009) Russian Big Business; the First Fifteen Years. Economic 
Chronicle 1993-2008 (In Russian), Moscow, SU HSE Publishing House.  
Pejovic, S. (2003), “Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: it's the Culture, 
 27
Stupid”, The Review of Austrian Economics 16 (4): 347-361. 
Peng, M.W., Heath, P.S. (1996), “The Growth of the Firms in Planned Economies in 
Transition: Institutions, Organizations and Strategic Choice” Academy of Management 
Journal 21 (2): 492-528.  
Raiser, M., Rousso, A., Steves, F., Teksoz, U. (2008), “Trust in Transition: Cross-Country 
and Firm Evidence”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24 (2): 407-433.  
Stark, D. (1997), “Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism” in Grabner G. and  
Stark D. (Eds.) Restructuring Networks in Postsocialism. London: Oxford University 
Press, 35-69. 
Williamson, O (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press. 
Yasin, Ye. (Ed.) (2004). Structural Changes in the Russian Industry, Moscow, SU HSE 
Publishing House.  
Zhang J., Keh Н.T (2009), “Interorganizational Exchanges in China: Organizational Forms 
and Governance Mechanisms”, Management and Organization Review 6 (1): 123–147.  
Zhou, K.Z., Poppo, L., Yang, Z. (2008), “Relational ties or customized contracts? An 
Examination of Alternative Governance Choices in China”. Journal of International 
Business Studies 39 (3): 526-534.  
 
 
References  
Avdasheva, S (2009), “Impact of Business Integration on Corporate Restructuring and 
Performance” in  Dolgopyatova, T., Iwasaki, I., Yakvlev, A. (Eds) Organization and 
Development of Russian Business: A Firm-Level Analysis, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 213-234. 
Avdasheva, S. (2007), “The Russian Furniture Industry: Firms' Upgrading According to the 
Value-Chain Theory”, Competition and Change, 11(4): 307-328. 
Blanchard, O., Kremer, M. (1997), “Disorganization”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112(4): 1091-1126. 
Brown, D.J., Earle, J.S., Telegdy, A. (2006), “The Productivity Effects of Privatisation: 
Longitudinal Estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 114(1): 61-99. 
Dolgopyatova, T. (2009), “Stock Ownership and Corporate Control” in Dolgopyatova, T., 
Iwasaki, I., Yakvlev, A. (Eds) Organization and Development of Russian Business: A 
Firm-Level Analysis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 39-61. 
Frye, T. (2004), “Credible Commitments and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia” 
American Political Science Review, 3(98): 453 – 466. 
Frye, T. (2005), Original Sin, Good Work and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence from a 
Survey Experiment, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series. WP No 811. 
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The Governance of Global Value Chains”, 
Review of International Political Economy, 12(1): 78–104.  
Goldberg, V. (1980), “Relational Exchange, Economics and Complex Contracts”, American 
Behavioral Scientist, 23 (3): 337 – 352. 
Guriev, S., Rachinsky, A. (2005), “The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19 (1): 131-150.   
Hendley, K., Murrell, P. (2003), “Which Mechanism Support the Fulfillment of Sales 
Agreement? Asking Decision-Makers in Firms”, Economic Letters 78 (1): 49-54.  
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff C. (2002), “Courts and Relational Contracts”, Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 18 (1): 221-277.  
 28
Kaplinsky, R., Morris, M. (2003), Handbook for Value Chain Research. Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Macaulay, S. (1963), “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”. 
American Sociological Review 28 (1): 55–67. 
Manolova T.S., Gyoshev, B.S., Manev I. M. (2007), “The Role of Impersonal Trust for 
Entrepreneurial Exchange in a Transition Economy”, International Journal of Emerging 
Markets 2(2): 107-122. 
Menard, C. (2004), “The Economics of Hybrid Organizations”, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics , 160 (3): 345-376.  
Murrell P. (2005) Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies. in: Menard C., Shirley M. 
(eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Kluwer Academic Press. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: 
Norton.  
Pappe, Ya., Galukhina, Ya. (2009) Russian Big Business; the First Fifteen Years. Economic 
Chronicle 1993-2008 (In Russian), Moscow, SU HSE Publishing House.  
Pejovic, S. (2003), “Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: it's the Culture, 
Stupid”, The Review of Austrian Economics 16 (4): 347-361. 
Peng, M.W., Heath, P.S. (1996), “The Growth of the Firms in Planned Economies in 
Transition: Institutions, Organizations and Strategic Choice” Academy of Management 
Journal 21 (2): 492-528.  
Raiser, M., Rousso, A., Steves, F., Teksoz, U. (2008), “Trust in Transition: Cross-Country 
and Firm Evidence”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24 (2): 407-433.  
Stark, D. (1997), “Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism” in Grabner G. and  
Stark D. (Eds.) Restructuring Networks in Postsocialism. London: Oxford University 
Press, 35-69. 
Williamson, O (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press. 
Yasin, Ye. (Ed.) (2004). Structural Changes in the Russian Industry, Moscow, SU HSE 
Publishing House.  
Zhang J., Keh Н.T (2009), “Interorganizational Exchanges in China: Organizational Forms 
and Governance Mechanisms”, Management and Organization Review 6 (1): 123–147.  
Zhou, K.Z., Poppo, L., Yang, Z. (2008), “Relational ties or customized contracts? An 
Examination of Alternative Governance Choices in China”. Journal of International 
Business Studies 39 (3): 526-534.  
 
